Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic
これですよ。日銀がおそれる事態というのは。
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http://www.minneapolisfed.org/research/QR/QR531.pdf
＜On the other hand, imagine that fiscal policy dominates
monetary policy. The fiscal authority independently sets
its budgets, announcing all current and future deficits and
surpluses and thus determining the amount of revenue
that must be raised through bond sales and seignorage.
Under this second coordination scheme, the monetary
authority faces the constraints imposed by the demand for
government bonds, for it must try to finance with
seignorage any discrepancy between the revenue demanded
by the fiscal authority and the amount of bonds
that can be sold to the public. Although such a monetary
authority might still be able to control inflation permanently,
it is less powerful than a monetary authority under the
first coordination scheme. If the fiscal authority's deficits
cannot be financed solely by new bond sales, then the
monetary authority is forced to create money and tolerate
additional inflation.
Under the second coordination scheme, where the
monetary authority faces the constraints imposed by the
demand for government bonds, the form of this demand is
important in determining whether or not the monetary
authority can control inflation permanently. In particular,
suppose that the demand for government bonds implies
an interest rate on bonds greater than the economy's rate
of growth. Then, if the fiscal authority runs deficits, the
monetary authority is unable to control either the growth
rate of the monetary base or inflation forever.
The monetary authority's inability to control inflation
permanently under these circumstances follows from the
arithmetic of the constraints it faces. Being limited simply
to dividing government debt between bonds and base
money and getting no help from budget surpluses, a
monetary authority trying to fight current inflation can
only do so by holding down the growth of base money and
letting the real stock of bonds held by the public grow. If
the principal and interest due on these additional bonds
are raised by selling still more bonds, so as to continue to
hold down the growth in base money, then, because the
interest rate on bonds is greater than the economy's
growth rate, the real stock of bonds will grow faster than
the size of the economy. This cannot go on forever, since
the demand for bonds places an upper limit on the stock of
bonds relative to the size of the economy. Once that limit
is reached, the principal and interest due on the bonds
already sold to fight inflation must be financed, at least in
part, by seignorage, requiring the creation of additional
base money. Sooner or later, in a monetarist economy,
the result is additional inflation.＞
*************************************************
http://www.minneapolisfed.org/research/QR/QR531.pdf
＜On the other hand, imagine that fiscal policy dominates
monetary policy. The fiscal authority independently sets
its budgets, announcing all current and future deficits and
surpluses and thus determining the amount of revenue
that must be raised through bond sales and seignorage.
Under this second coordination scheme, the monetary
authority faces the constraints imposed by the demand for
government bonds, for it must try to finance with
seignorage any discrepancy between the revenue demanded
by the fiscal authority and the amount of bonds
that can be sold to the public. Although such a monetary
authority might still be able to control inflation permanently,
it is less powerful than a monetary authority under the
first coordination scheme. If the fiscal authority's deficits
cannot be financed solely by new bond sales, then the
monetary authority is forced to create money and tolerate
additional inflation.
Under the second coordination scheme, where the
monetary authority faces the constraints imposed by the
demand for government bonds, the form of this demand is
important in determining whether or not the monetary
authority can control inflation permanently. In particular,
suppose that the demand for government bonds implies
an interest rate on bonds greater than the economy's rate
of growth. Then, if the fiscal authority runs deficits, the
monetary authority is unable to control either the growth
rate of the monetary base or inflation forever.
The monetary authority's inability to control inflation
permanently under these circumstances follows from the
arithmetic of the constraints it faces. Being limited simply
to dividing government debt between bonds and base
money and getting no help from budget surpluses, a
monetary authority trying to fight current inflation can
only do so by holding down the growth of base money and
letting the real stock of bonds held by the public grow. If
the principal and interest due on these additional bonds
are raised by selling still more bonds, so as to continue to
hold down the growth in base money, then, because the
interest rate on bonds is greater than the economy's
growth rate, the real stock of bonds will grow faster than
the size of the economy. This cannot go on forever, since
the demand for bonds places an upper limit on the stock of
bonds relative to the size of the economy. Once that limit
is reached, the principal and interest due on the bonds
already sold to fight inflation must be financed, at least in
part, by seignorage, requiring the creation of additional
base money. Sooner or later, in a monetarist economy,
the result is additional inflation.＞
